European governments are placing greater scrutiny on their reliance on Palantir and other foreign technology providers as control over data, artificial intelligence and critical digital infrastructure moves higher on the national security agenda.
The development, highlighted by POLITICO Europe, does not amount to a coordinated European retreat from the American data-analytics company. Palantir continues to hold significant government contracts across the region, and the actions under consideration differ substantially from country to country.
Together, however, they reflect a broader debate over whether European governments can preserve strategic autonomy while relying on foreign-built platforms for intelligence, defense, policing, healthcare and other essential public services.
France has taken one of the clearest steps. Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced in June that the country’s domestic intelligence agency, the DGSI, would gradually replace Palantir’s data-analysis tools with technology developed by French company ChapsVision.
Lecornu presented the decision as part of France’s effort to avoid creating new strategic dependencies. The transition is expected to take years, however, and Palantir’s contract—renewed in late 2025—remains in effect while the French alternative is introduced.
Palantir objected to the way the announcement was made and said it had not received adequate formal notice. The company maintains that its software operates within a closed French network and that it cannot access the DGSI’s data remotely.
From Technology Contract to Security Strategy
Palantir’s platforms allow public institutions to combine and analyze information held across different databases and operational systems. Governments have used the technology in areas where the ability to process large volumes of data quickly can have significant operational value.
That capability can also make replacing the platform difficult once it becomes embedded within an institution.
The question confronting European governments is therefore broader than whether Palantir’s software performs effectively. Policymakers are increasingly examining whether public authorities retain sufficient technical knowledge, contractual flexibility and operational control to change providers without disrupting essential services.
A report published in June by the UK Parliament’s Science, Innovation and Technology Committee described Palantir’s expanding presence in the British public sector as an “unacceptable point of weakness.” The committee stressed that its concern was not based on evidence of wrongdoing by the company, but on the risks created when government becomes too dependent on any single supplier.
The committee argued that the UK government should strengthen its internal digital capabilities and avoid allowing private contractors to become effectively irreplaceable. It also noted that Palantir is not the only company capable of providing the data-integration technology required by public institutions.
This distinction is important. Supplier concentration can create strategic vulnerability even when a technology is secure, effective and operated in accordance with its contract.
Europe Expands Its Sovereignty Agenda
The European Commission is seeking to translate technological sovereignty from a political ambition into industrial and procurement policy.
In June, the Commission presented a European Technological Sovereignty Package covering semiconductors, cloud computing, artificial intelligence and open-source software. The package includes proposed updates to the EU Chips Act, a Cloud and AI Development Act, an open-source strategy and a roadmap for digitalization and AI in the energy sector.
The Commission said the measures are intended to strengthen Europe’s digital autonomy and resilience while expanding its capacity to develop and operate critical technologies.
It has also incorporated sovereignty requirements into cloud procurement for EU institutions. In April, the Commission awarded a €180 million sovereign-cloud framework contract to four providers, with criteria addressing legal jurisdiction, operational control and compliance with EU laws and values.
These policies reflect a widening understanding of digital sovereignty. Keeping information physically inside Europe may not be sufficient when software, technical support, corporate decision-making or legal obligations remain controlled in another jurisdiction.
Sovereignty in this context does not necessarily mean excluding foreign companies. It increasingly means ensuring that governments maintain meaningful control, preserve alternatives and can continue operating critical systems during political, legal or commercial disruption.
Different Responses Across Europe
European scrutiny of Palantir has taken several forms.
In Switzerland, Palantir sought government and military business but did not secure public-sector contracts. Reporting based on freedom-of-information requests found that Swiss authorities repeatedly declined the company’s proposals amid concerns that included dependency and control over sensitive information.
Palantir challenged parts of that reporting through Switzerland’s statutory right-of-reply process. A Zurich court later dismissed most of the company’s requested counterstatements while requiring the publication to carry a response to one specific claim.
Spain has reportedly advised some state-backed companies not to enter new Palantir agreements where sensitive strategic information could be involved. Because the measure has primarily been reported through media accounts rather than a comprehensive public government directive, it is more accurately described as reported procurement guidance than as a blanket national ban.
In Denmark, reporting indicates that authorities have explored alternatives to Palantir for data-fusion capabilities. Publicly available details remain limited, making it difficult to determine the scope or status of those discussions.
The United Kingdom is taking a different course. Palantir retains significant roles in government, including a major contract supporting the NHS Federated Data Platform. At the same time, lawmakers and procurement authorities are questioning whether the scale of that reliance creates excessive dependency.
London’s policing authority blocked a proposed Metropolitan Police procurement potentially worth up to £50 million, citing alleged flaws in the tender process and concerns about competition and value for money. Palantir is contesting the decision. The dispute has not established that the company’s technology itself is insecure.
These examples illustrate a common concern but not a common policy. Some governments are seeking domestic alternatives, some have declined Palantir proposals, and others continue using the company while considering stronger safeguards against supplier concentration.
The Trade-Offs Behind Strategic Autonomy
Reducing reliance on established technology providers carries financial and operational risks.
European alternatives may initially lack the scale, experience or functionality of larger American platforms. Governments could face higher costs, slower deployment and reduced interoperability if sovereignty requirements are implemented inconsistently across national markets.
France’s planned transition illustrates that tension. ChapsVision has expanded rapidly through acquisitions and won a strategically important DGSI contract, but it must now demonstrate that it can integrate its technologies and operate reliably in an exceptionally sensitive environment.
The French company has also established an independent ethics committee empowered to reject or halt projects it considers too risky. ChapsVision says the committee assesses contracts against European regulations and international principles, although the effectiveness of that mechanism will depend on how it operates in practice.
Palantir, for its part, argues that its software strengthens the operational capabilities of allied governments and that customers retain control over their data and deployments. France’s continued use of the platform during the transition demonstrates the value the DGSI has placed on its technology, even as the government seeks a sovereign replacement.
The policy challenge is therefore not simply choosing between American and European companies. It is ensuring that governments can use capable technology without becoming unable to replace, audit or operate it independently.
Procurement Becomes a Measure of Resilience
Palantir has become a visible symbol of Europe’s technology dependency, but replacing one provider would not deliver digital sovereignty on its own.
The larger challenge is developing competitive European cloud, AI, cybersecurity and data-analysis industries while retaining access to advanced international technologies and interoperability with allies.
Government procurement is consequently becoming an instrument of national and economic security. Decisions once treated primarily as technical or administrative are now being evaluated according to their implications for resilience, jurisdiction, institutional capacity and strategic control.
Europe’s success will not be measured simply by how many Palantir contracts governments retain or replace. It will depend on whether public institutions can preserve genuine technological choice—and whether European alternatives can deliver the performance, security and reliability required when the stakes are highest.
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